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PHI 207: Introduction to Indian Philosophy
Everett/Waggle Section

Jainism

            The Jains are the followers of Vardhamāna (Mahāvīra) (599 to 527 BCE) who systematized the doctrine of the three tirthankaras (founders of the path), Rshabha, Ajitanātha, and Arshtanemi (all of ancient date, and mentioned in the Yajur Veda). The Jaina system does not accept the authority of the Vedas. It commends the truth of its system on the ground of its accordance with reality. Its scheme of the universe is said to be grounded in logic and experience. Its central features are its realistic classification of being, its theory of knowledge with its celebrated doctrines of syādavāda and saptabhangi, and its ascetic ethics.

            The Jains admit five kinds of knowledge, (1) mati or ordinary cognition, which includes memory, recognition, and induction; (2) shruti or knowledge derived through signs, symbols, or words, which includes association, attention, understanding, and naya or aspects of the meaning of things; (3) avadhi or direct knowledge of things at a distance in time or space; (4) manahparyāya or direct knowledge of the thoughts of others; and (5) kevala or perfect knowledge, which is all-comprehensive. The first three are liable to error, not the last two.

            Consciousness is the essence of the self; its manifestations are perception and intelligence. The former is simple apprehension, while the latter is conceptual knowledge. The Jains adopt the mediate theory of perception, and hold that things are extramental realities. The relation between knowledge and its object is an external one with regard to physical objects, though it is different in the case of self-consciousness. As light reveals itself and other objects, so jñāna (wisdom) reveals itself and others. In knowing any object the self knows itself simultaneously.

            In its perfect condition the soul is pure jñāna and darshana, i.e., knowledge and intuition. In its imperfect condition there are disturbing media, passions and emotions, which cause the inflow of matter and prevent the soul from exercising its natural function in full measure. Souls are substances characterized by their intelligence, and differences among souls are due to the degrees of their connection with matter.

            A prominent feature of Jainic logic is its doctrine of naya (aspects or standpoints). Knowledge is either of the thing as it is in itself (pramana) or of the thing in its relation (naya). Nayas give us knowledge of a thing from a particular standpoint and these relative views are abstractions from which reality is regarded. The nayas are said to be seven in number. In the saptabhangi (seven forms), we use judgment in seven different ways to discriminate the several qualities of an object. Jainism holds that all knowledge is only probable or partial. It gives us a “somehow”, a “perhaps”, or a “maybe” (syād). This is the doctrine of syādvāda. This doctrine amounts to the assertion that reality, whatever it is, expresses itself in multiple forms, with the result that no absolute predication is possible. This view in general is called anekāntavāda, the doctrine that reality have many (literally, “not-one”) aspects, leading to the possibility of only relative predication. Jainic logic is opposed to the views of the other systems, which in opposition to it are called ekāntavāda, the doctrine that reality has but one true nature, thus grounding the possibility of absolute predication. This doctrine of the namy-sidedness of reality is a result of the doctrine of nayas, points of view. These seven forms are as follows:

1. Somehow a thing is.
2. Somehow it is not.
3. Somehow it both is and is not.
4. Somehow it is indescribable.
5. Somehow it is and is indescribable.
6. Somehow it is not and is indescribable.
7. Somehow it is, is not, and is indescribable.

Perhaps this might make these seven paths more clear. We may desire to make a statement of the affirmation about a thing with regard to its substance, time, place or qualities. Second, we may desire to make a statement of negation. Third, we may combine both these forms of affirmation and negation and say that in one sense it is and in another sense it is not. Fourth, we might say of a thing that it is indescribable, when we are in difficulty about the possibility of a precise word for a thing. These give us four formal points of view. The first thee combined with the fourth possibility, that of indescribability, gives us the seven possible forms of a statement.

            The whole universe is traced to the everlasting, uncreated, independent categories of jiva and ajiva, the conscious and the unconscious. Animate beings are composed of soul and body. The souls are distinct from matter and are eternal. Nonconsciousness is divided into two main classes, those without form (arupa) such as dharma (here, the principle of motion), adharma (the principle of rest), space, and time, and those with form (rupa) such as matter. The Jains believe in the stomic structure of the universe.

            The cause of the soul’s embodiment is the presence in it of what is called karmic matter. The self is never separated from matter until its final release. The way to deliverance is through the three jewels of right faith, right knowledge, and right conduct. Belief in real existence or the tattvas is right faith. Knowledge of real nature without doubt or error is right knowledge. The practice of the five virtues (ahimsā) non-violence, truth-speaking, non-stealing, chastity, and non-attachment to worldly things constitute right conduct. The Jains were the first to make ahimsā, non-violence, into a rule of life.

            The state of “release” for the Jains is one of distinctiveness of the selves endowed with the qualities that are generally attributed to the divine principle in other systems, such as perfect tranquillity, perfect knowledge, and perfect power.

For questions or comments, e-mail me at ljwaggl@ilstu.edu