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PHI 207: Introduction to Indian Philosophy
Everett/Waggle Section

Mimamsa

            The central problem of this system is the investigation of dharma, duty, and especially as it is stated in the Vedas. This system sets forth some important philosophical speculations, though they are subservient to its main practical interests.

            As the Vedas are the main source of dharma they are said to be eternally valid. The Vedas are not the work of god. They are uncreated, and the seers apprehend and transmit them. Elaborate discussions about sounds, words, and meanings are to be found in the Mimamsa works. In the course of studies or demonstrations of the validity and eternality of the Vedas.

            As the Vedic injunctions hold out promises of rewards to be enjoyed in another world, they assume the reality of selves. The self is distinct from the body, the senses, and the understanding.

            Acts are enjoined with a view to their fruits. Between an act and its result there is a necessary connection. An act performed today may achieve its results at some later date, and in the meantime the result is in the form of an unseen force or apurva, which may be regarded either as the imperceptible antecedent of the fruit or the after-state of the act itself. The deferred fruition of acts is possible only through the force of apurva.

            Liberation for Mimamsa is life in heaven and not the state of ultimate release found in most other systems of Indian thought. Later Mimamsa thinkers, however, were not untouched by the prevalent tendency in other systems of thought. Prabhakara (7^th cent. CE.) defines liberation as “the absolute cessation of the body caused by the disappearance of all dharma and adharma (merit and demerit).” For Kumarila Bhatta (7^th cent. CE.) it is the state of the self free from pain. Jaimini, the author of the Mimamsa Shutra (ca. 400 BCE.) Admits the reality of the Vedic deities, to whom sacrifices are offered, but does not argue for the existence of a supreme god. He does not so much deny god as ignore him. Some later Mimamsakas admit the reality of god. Others, however, argue extensively against the existence and the necessity of god, as, for example, does Kumarila in the Shlokavartika.

            In the field of logic and epistemology, later Mimamsa made some notable contributions. Unlike the Nyaya and other systems of Hindu philosophy, it believes in six - instead of four - means of valid knowledge. The two that are added are knowledge by arthapatti (presumption or postulation) and knowledge by abhava (absence, negation, or non-existence). It is argued that these two valid means of knowledge are not accounted for by the usual valid means of knowledge. A more interesting factor, however, of the Mimamsa philosophy is its unique epistemological theory of the validity of all cognition as such. It is held that all knowledge is ipso facto true. Thus, what is to be proven is not the truth of a cognition, but its falsity. Not only did the Mimamsakas make the very great use of this theory to establish the unchallengeable validity of the Vedas, but later Vedantists also drew freely upon this Mimamsa contribution.

For questions or comments, e-mail me at ljwaggl@ilstu.edu