Book, Chapter in Scholarly Book-New
“Machine Intentionality, the Moral Status of Machines, and the Composition Problem” in Philosophy & Theory of Artificial Intelligence, (Ed.) Vincent C. Müller, Springer: New York, NY, 2012, pp. 321-333.
“Why God Is Not a Semantic Realist,” in Realism and Antirealism, edited by William P. Alston Cornell University Press: Ithica, NY, 2002.
Journal Article, Academic Journal
“Causality-Dependent Consciousness and Consciousness-Dependent Causality” Journal of Consciousness Studies 2012, 19:12-39.
“Consciousness and Realism” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2007, 14: 1-17.
Journal Article, Professional Journal
Anderson, D. Humans Using Machines, Humans as Machines: Implications for Teaching and Learning. Humanities and Technology Review. Humanities and Technology Review 27 (2008): 1-23.
“A Semantics for Virtual Environments and the Ontological Status of Virtual Objects” American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers, Fall 2009, Vol. 09(1):15-19.
Machine Intentionality, the Moral Status of Machines, and the Composition Problem. Central Division APA Session on "Machine Consciousness". Central Division APA. (2012)
“An Agent-Centered Defense of Phenomenal Intentionality: The Moral Status Argument”. Illinois Philosophical Association Meeting. Illinois Philosophical Association. (2011)
“Machine Intentionality, the Moral Status of Machines, and the Composition Problem”. Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence. (2011)
“Why Intentional Machines Must be Moral Agents (or at least Moral Patients)”. APA Central Division Meetings. American Philosophical Association. (2010)
"Confronting the Externalist Juggernaught in Theories of Mind, Language, Perception, and Knowledge: What place Prospectivism, Internalism, and Consciousness?". Institute for Prospective Cognition Conference. Institute for Prospective Cognition. (2009)
“Two Causalities, Two Selves, Two Languages, Two Worlds”. Varieties of Causation in Consciousness Studies. (2008)